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This deteriorates social welfare because of inequality aversion, as expressed by decreasing marginal utility of consumption.
The social discount rate can be interpreted as the minimum rate of return that is necessary to compensate for the increased inequality generated by the investment. For an intuitive precautionary argument, this growth effect is reduced if growth is uncertain. To complete the picture, if the investment raises the collective risk, this discount rate should also contain a risk premium. Recent developments (Weitzman (1998 , 2001 , 2013 ), Gollier (2008 , Arrow et al. (2013) ) converge towards recommending using a smaller discount rate for safe assets maturing later. In this paper, we show that this recommendation applied to the risk free rate relies on the assumption that shocks on the growth rate of consumption exhibit some degree of persistence. We also show that this implies in parallel an increasing term structure for the risk premium. Globally, the risk-adjusted discount rate will have a decreasing term structure only if the asset's beta is small enough. 
I. The benchmark asset pricing model
is the risk free rate and
is the CCAPM systematic risk premium. We see from (4) and (5) that the risk free rate is the sum of the rate of impatience  , a growth effect which is proportional to the annualized expectation of the cumulative change in log consumption, and a negative precautionary effect which is proportional to its annualized variance, as is the risk premium. If we suppose that consumption follows a geometric
Brownian motion with drift  and volatility  , then the annualized expectation and the annualized variance of the cumulative change in log consumption are constant across maturities. In particular, we have that
This implies that the term structures of the risk free rate and of the risk premium are flat in that classical CCAPM case:
In the absence of serial correlation in the (4), (5) and (9) that it should be decreasing only if the project's  is smaller than / 2  . For larger betas, the risk aversion effect (increasing term structure of the risk premium) dominates the precautionary effect (decreasing term structure of the risk free rate), so that the associated discount rate should in fact be increasing with maturity.
III. Interdependent growth rates
In the previous sections, we assumed that future consumption is lognormally distributed. (2) are affected by the serial interdependence of growth rates. The implied increased in risk in ln t c raises both expectations, so that its effect on the risk-adjusted discount rate is ambiguous, as explained for example by Gollier (1995) and Abel (2002) . Using second-order Taylor expansions à la ArrowPratt to approximate these expectations yields the following result.  .
IV. Concluding remarks
If the uncertainty on future consumption accumulates faster than in the geometric Brownian case, for example because shocks to the growth rate are persistent, then the rate at which one should discount future safe cash flows has a decreasing term structure. This result is driven by the assumption that the representative agent is prudent. But by risk aversion, the risk premium has an increasing term structure in this world. We showed that this implies that risk-adjusted discount rates have an increasing term structure if the beta of the future benefit is larger than half the relative risk aversion. This also implies that economists should devote more energy to estimate the beta of long-dated investments, for example in the case of environmental policies. In particular, we believe that it is now crucial to focus the debate related to the social cost of carbon on the "climate beta". Do we believe that most of the benefits of fighting climate change will materialize when future consumption will be large (for example because of the large associated level of emissions), or when future consumption will small?
